A few weeks ago, Russia updated its nuclear doctrine, followed by the United States elections, and we learned that the new administration included some guidelines on major rearmament in Project 25; And not just against Moscow, but more importantly, at the elephant on the table, which is probably no longer called China. Given that many war conflicts are far from over and there are tensions in regions and islands around the planet, it’s a good time to revive a story from the Cold War: The Proud Prophet.

Delicate “nuclear” balance. A few weeks ago, the New York Times reported that since the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, nuclear conflict has become a complex form of communication in which each test, treaty or threat sends a strategic message. But there is no doubt that this “nuclear language” operates in an environment of distrust and uncertainty.

If we were to follow common sense, we would say that it is key to global survival for the powers that be to maintain open and sustainable communication, while being aware of how easily misinterpretation can arise. Precisely during the Cold War, communications systems and deterrence capabilities were designed to prevent surprise and guarantee retaliation, but with the end of the conflict, attention turned to emerging threats such as terrorism and cybersecurity, pushing nuclear de-escalation capabilities into the background. .

Arms race. We said it a few weeks ago. The global nuclear situation has changed considerably in recent years. Powers such as China, Russia, and the United States have accelerated (or are in the process of) modernizing their arsenals, introducing new warheads, advanced delivery vehicles, and tactical nuclear weapons designed to minimize collateral damage.

These smaller weapons, although supposedly a deterrent, are more attractive to use in conventional conflicts, increasing the risk of uncontrolled escalation, again with the emphasis on so-called “tactics”. Additionally, the expiration of key arms control agreements and mistrust between powers has created a dangerous strategic environment in which communications have broken down and the possibilities of limited nuclear conflict have re-emerged.

Escalate to reduce tension. The concept of a “limited” use of nuclear weapons to control military tension is one of the most dangerous theories debated in military circles. In this context, it is argued that a tactical nuclear strike could stop the enemy, forcing him to reconsider his position and surrender to diplomatic negotiations.

But history and strategic logic show that this belief is a dangerous fantasy that ignores the inevitable catastrophic consequences of any nuclear exchange. Basically the strategy is underestimating. or the ability to size up the emotional and strategic response of an adversary who might view the attack as an existential threat and initiate a major nuclear exchange. For all that remains: the game that started many years ago.

Proud Prophet. This happened in 1983, when the Pentagon organized a war game of sorts under the title Proud Prophet to evaluate U.S. nuclear strategies in a hypothetical conflict with the Soviet Union. This exercise was unique because it used real plans, secret communication channels, while also allowing events to unfold without predetermined restrictions, and involved senior defense officials, top-secret plans, and real-time simulations.

During the exercise, the initial escalation led to the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons for “de-escalation” and unleashed a chain of Soviet retaliation that resulted in global devastation: the Soviets interpreted the attack as a threat to their existence and responded with an attack. massive nuclear bombing. This caused an uncontrollable surge that killed more than a billion people, according to the simulation, and left large areas of the northern hemisphere uninhabitable.

The exercise demonstrated that once a nuclear conflict begins, control is impossible even with low-intensity/tactical or limited weapons. The main lesson was clear: there is no way to manage a nuclear war, and any attempt to do so would inevitably lead to disaster.

Dangerous insistence. There is no doubt that the game/simulator was a lesson. However, the idea of ​​limited nuclear war has reemerged in contemporary military thought. The United States has invested in the development of new tactical nuclear weapons, such as the long-range nuclear cruise missile (LRSO), designed to provide strategic flexibility in conflict. Although they are presented as a means of deterrence, these weapons lower the threshold for use and strengthen the false perception that a nuclear exchange can be controlled.

Names such as former Defense Secretary Robert Work pointed out that “any use of nuclear power is the ultimate way to escalate tensions” and that considering taking nuclear tensions under control is “playing with fire”. Even Reagan concluded after the conclusions of Proud Prophet that “a nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought.” Other “famous” experts, such as Paul Bracken and Bruce Blair, have warned of the risks of these policies, pointing out that the pursuit of nuclear dominance, far from being a deterrent, further destabilizes global security. Investments in tactical nuclear weapons show that this warning has been widely disregarded, leading to a dangerous view that the weapons are “usable.”

Misinterpretation. As reported in the Times, the crux of the problem likely stems from a lack of trust and the ease with which strategic messages can be misinterpreted. During Proud Prophet, both sides of the exercise experienced moments when they believed they were winning and losing at the same time, proving how opacity on the battlefield can lead to disastrous decisions. Today, mistrust and fragile communication systems between powers increase the risk that miscalculation will trigger a nuclear conflict. The Cold War simulator warned of this decades ago.

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